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ABSTRACT 
The main questions addressed in the present article are: How the divine knowledge of the 
essence and the creatures is perceived by Avicenna and Mulla Sadra? What are possible 
similarities and differences in the viewpoints of the two philosophers? And which view 
is more complete and less defective? According to the findings of the study, Avicenna 
and Mulla Sadra interpret God's knowledge of the essence through the union of the 
knower and the known, but the divine knowledge of the creatures is addressed by 
Avicenna through the imprinted forms while Mulla Sadra deals with the issue through the 
principality of existence and its degrees of gradation. It was also shown that the 
explanation of Avicenna about God's knowledge of the creatures faces problems such as 
the emptiness of the God’s essence from the cognitive perfection. But Mulla Sadra's 
explanation can account for this issue more effectively.  
Keywords: the union of the knower and the known, imprinted forms, priority and 
gradation of existence, intuitive knowledge, acquired knowledge, knowledge in 
undifferentiated mode and in detailed fashion 
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Divine knowledge as one of the most difficult and complex issues of the Islamic 
philosophy in the history of philosophy has always been proved as a serious challenge for 
philosophers. Usually, philosophers consider the God’s knowledge of his own essence as 
a kind of intuitive knowledge and there is no significant controversy between them in this 
regard. However, there is a serious controversy among philosophers over the God’s 
knowledge of the creatures, especially about the knowledge of material and variable 
beings in the degree of essence. Some have considered this knowledge to be acquired, 
some have assumed it to be intuitive, and others have supposed it as belonging to the 
undifferentiated mode or differentiated mode. Therefore, research into recognizing the 
views of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, the former as the representative of Aristotelian 
philosophy and the latter as the transcendent theosophy, seems to be necessary. 
The divine knowledge is usually discussed in philosophical books in three sections: (1) 
Divine knowledge of his own essence, (2) Divine knowledge of the creatures in the degree 
of essence, and (3) Divine knowledge of the creatures in the degree of creations. 
Considering  the Given huge bulk of the materials and the focus of scholars on the first 
two sections, we discuss only the same  focused sections in this article. Employing a 
descriptive-analytical method, this article attempts to present and analyze the views of 
Avicenna and Mulla Sadra with the intention to shed light on their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
2. DIVINE KNOWLEDGE FROM AVICENNA’S VIEWPOINT  
The divine knowledge of the essence: Avicenna believes that Allah Almighty has 
knowledge of his own essence, and this knowledge is intuitive not acquired (Avicenna, 
1984). According to this explanation, it seems that for Avicenna, God is a necessary 
essential existence, and that the essential necessity or self-necessity requires that he shall 
be complete in all aspects, that is to say, he has no components and no potential or 
property, because the prerequisite to have components requires a need and the prerequisite 
to have potentials requires a defect. In addition, as God is self-contained and immaterial 
in terms of properties, then he is aware of his own essence. This is to say that, on the one 
hand, as his abstract essence is immanent for his own immaterial essence, he is intellectual 
and, on the other hand, for the same reason it can be understood that he is a rational being. 
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Therefore, the divine immaterial essence is both intellectual and intelligent. In other 
words, God’s essence is both knower and the object of knowledge.       
Of course, in order to understand Avicenna’s views, it should be noted that knowledge is 
divided into two types: Intuitive and acquired knowledge. In intuitive knowledge, the 
known external existence is immanent in the presence of the knower, but in the acquired 
or discursive knowledge, the known conception is immanent  in the presence of the 
knower.  
3. QUESTION AND ANSWER 
It is argued that the requirement of Avicenna’s words about the God’s knowledge of his 
own essence is that the two attributes of intellectual and intelligent are the same thing, 
that is, if something is intellectual, it must be intelligent; while sometimes we believe in 
intellectuality of something without considering it to be intelligent, and vice versa (Fakhr 
Razi, 1411 AH). In response, it is said that this problem occurred because of the fact that 
the conception and extension (referent of a concept) are confused with each other and 
when two things are contradiction in terms of conception, it does not mean that they are 
also contradictory in the referent of the concept (Mulla Sadra, 1981).  
A.Another question and answers 
It is stated that the knower and the object of knowledge (the known) are correlatives, and 
correlatives are confrontation and they cannot be gathered around  in unity. In response 
to the above statement, it can be said that the knower and the object of knowledge (the 
known) are not correlatives because attribution is repeated in correlatives, while there is 
no attribution repeat  between the knower and the object of knowledge, and every 
conscious human can perceive himself, and considers the knower and the object of 
knowledge to be the same thing (Ibid). 
B. God’s knowledge of creatures before creation 
Avicenna believes that the God’s knowledge of his own essence is the knowledge of the 
perfect cause of an object, and such knowledge requires having the knowledge of the 
effect of that object (Avicenna, 1984). 
It should be noted that as it was stated earlier, God has knowledge of his own essence, 
and since there was nothing before the creation of beings other than God to be involved 
in the creation process, therefore God is the perfect cause of all beings and since the full 
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knowledge of the cause is the same as the knowledge of the essence of the cause and all 
its necessities, including the effect, so full knowledge of the cause requires having the 
knowledge of the effect.  
Avicenna believes that the God’s knowledge of the creatures comes through imprinted 
forms, which are issued from the divine essence and are beyond the essence, and 
necessary essentially for the essence and dependent on the divine self- contained essence 
(Ibid). In addition, in Avicenna’s view, the God’s knowledge of these forms is an active 
knowledge not a passive knowledge, but it is the same as the essence of these forms. For 
Avicenna, God's knowledge of the beings come through the acquisition of these imprinted 
forms, in the way that creatures are initially known by God through the imprinted forms, 
and then they come to existence.  
God's knowledge of the beings is an active knowledge, not the passive knowledge, that 
is, God's knowledge of the beings causes the existence of beings and this knowledge does 
not come from the beings. For instance, the knowledge of an inventor of his own 
inventions is the cause of the invention, and it is not the independent existence of the 
invention that creates the inventor’s knowledge of that invention.  
 Of course, it should be remembered that the God’s active knowledge is different from 
the man’s active knowledge, in the sense with this explanation that the man’s active 
knowledge is not the perfect cause of the effect in its totality in the outside world and 
there are other needed factors such as materials, tools, will, incitement of the members, 
etc. However, the God’s active knowledge is the perfect cause of the effect in the outside 
world (Ibid).  
One of the most important problems with the recognition that the God’s knowledge if the 
creatures, whether material or immaterial, is an acquired knowledge that such knowledge 
belongs to beings that are connected with the natural world through the power of senses, 
imagination, and fancy, and such knowledge cannot be attributed to immaterial beings, 
because the conception and judgment, and other qualities of acquired knowledge do not 
belong to the world of abstractions. Therefore, it can be suggested that God Almighty 
who is above and beyond all material things free from such a knowledge. That is, in the 
same way that the possession of material components is considered to be a defect and 
imperfection for God, the acquired science is also regarded a negative quality for the 
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divine essence (Mulla Sadra, 1981). In Mulla Sadra's terms, considering the God’s 
knowledge as acquired knowledge requires that external objects to be defined as known-
by-another rather than known-by-essence (Mulla Sadra, 1420 AH).  
In addition, acquired knowledge is not partial because individuality or particularity 
depends on an external existence, and imprinted forms are concepts that can be applied 
to many people and their particularity is correlative not actual. Therefore, if God's 
knowledge of creatures is considered to be a acquired knowledge, then God Almighty 
will not have any knowledge of external particularities (Javadi Amoli, 1993). 
Also, Avicenna’s argument in proving God's detailed knowledge of the creatures before 
their creation can only prove God's knowledge of the beings after the degree of God's 
essence, and cannot prove the unity and the sameness of God’s essence and his knowledge 
of the beings. As a result, it cannot be proved that the world of the creation is the most 
intelligent and the best ordering of thins (Mulla Sadra, 1981). 
In addition, Avicenna’s idea that the knowledge of the cause entails the knowledge of the 
effect is true only if the cause is the perfect or sufficient cause. However, God’s 
knowledge of the particularities of the affairs of the universe is not the perfect cause, 
because the creation of particularities requires other conditions such as time and place 
(Ibid).  
C. The quality of God's knowledge of material and variable affairs  
Now that it is clear that God Almighty is aware of all the components of the world, the 
question is: How is this knowledge? Does God's knowledge change with changes in 
material and particular affairs, or is God's knowledge fixed and unchangeable? 
Avicenna considers the God’s knowledge of the partial things is a general knowledge, 
that is, while the God’s knowledge dominates particularities, it is always fixed and 
unchangeable. Therefore, according to Avicenna, the God’s knowledge of particularities 
comes through intellectuality and the perception of general natures of those particular 
things. This means that the perception of particular matters happens through the causes 
of these matters. And if all the factors involved in the development of a particular matter 
are perceived,  then that part is perceived, and this perception, while it is general, has no 
other referent other than that particular thing (Avicenna, 1984). 
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Therefore, it can be said that God's knowledge of the particular matters has the following 
characteristics: 
1. As this knowledge is general it is always fixed and does not go through a change 
before, during, and after the creation of a particular matter or object.   
2. As this knowledge has been emerged through awareness about the origins and 
causes of the particular matter, it is a certain/definite knowledge, because the relationship 
between the cause and the effect is an essential relationship. 
3. This knowledge, while is universally sound and cover plural matters, does not 
have more than one referent of a concept, which is the particular matter.  
In order to elucidate his theory, Avicenna uses the example of the astrologer’s knowledge 
of lunar eclipse, stating that the astrologer’s knowledge is acquired through science the 
awareness about the motion of planets and celestial bodies and the connections and 
disconnections among them, and other things involved in the appearance of the eclipse. 
And such knowledge is constant and unchanged before, during, and after the creation of 
the eclipse. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although the astrologer’s knowledge is 
the knowledge of a general eclipse, this general eclipse that has occurred through 
individualizing accidents in the outside world does not have more than a referent that is 
that particular eclipse (Avicenna, 1413 AH).  
Reflecting on Avicenna’s ideas, the weakness of his theory concerning the obligatory 
knowledge of particular and external matters becomes evident, since conception is 
conceptually a general matter and it cannot turn into a particular matter by adding 
thousands of constraints for individualizing accidents.  
4. DIVINE KNOWLEDGE FROM MULLA SADRA'S VIEW 
This section addresses the divine knowledge from Mulla Sadra's view. 
A. God's knowledge of the essence  
Mulla Sadra proves that God's knowledge of his essence through the immateriality of his 
essence from materia and material things, explaining that God Almighty is a pure and 
indivisible existence; that is, and his reality is nothing but existence, and he is free from 
any defect or impossibility and possibility. In other words, the essence of every 
immaterial being is perfect and free from any potence, and its existence for another object 
is immanent whether that object is being itself or other than itself. Because the barrier to 
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the presence of on matter is its materiality and this is not the case for an immaterial 
existent. Moreover, since the truth of knowledge is the same as the presence for the known 
(the object of the knowledge) for the knower, then every immaterial essence is intellectual 
for its own essence. Also, the stronger the immaterial thing in existence, and the more 
intense in realization, and the more perfect in essence, the more perfect it will be in terms 
of intellect and intellectuality and the stronger it will be in terms of intelligence for its 
own essence. As a result, God's knowledge of his essence is the most complete and most 
intense of the sciences in terms of manifestation and illumination (Mulla Sadra, 1981).  
B. God's knowledge of creatures at the level of essence  
Considering the shortcomings of Avicenna’s view on God's knowledge of creatures, 
Mulla Sadra tries to put forward a theory that is free from the same weaknesses and 
shortcomings in the Avicenna's view. The fundamentals of Mulla Sadra's theory are as 
follows: (1) The existence is the principal and authentic, not essentia, implying that 
anything that has reality in the outside world and rejects non-existence is existence not 
essentia. (2) The existencehas degrees of gradation; that is, the existence has degrees and 
levels, and those in higher degrees possess all advantages and potentials of the matters of 
the lower grades, without the necessity for plurality. (3) “Basit ol-Haqiqa kol ol-Ashia va 
Laisa Besha'yen Menha” means The simple reality contains the perfections of all beings 
and is free from their imperfections. (4) God's knowledge of the creatures is not requisite 
for the essence of God, but it is the same as his essence. (5) God's knowledge of creatures 
is an intuitive and knowledge in undifferentiated mode that is the same as detailed 
unveiling. 
Mulla Sadra believes that the God’s detailed knowledge of creatures with respect to 
essence is not compatible with acquired knowledge and the originality of existence, which 
is associated with the distinction of the beings, and only based on the originality of 
existence and gradation of the reality of existence, it is possible to acknowledge that 
existence has the highest order which encompasses all perfections of lower levels in a 
decent manner in without necessitating plurality. In Mulla Sadra's view, a type of 
knowledge can be considered indivisible and in undifferentiated mode that is the same as 
detailed unveiling and such knowledge is the same as the exact essence of God (Ibid). 
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 Accordingly, God is free from all forms of compositions and he is invisible in all respects 
and possesses all the perfections. And the perfections of all beings are impeccably 
manifested in his essence, without causing plurality and the composition of that essence. 
Besides, since the truth of knowledge is the same as the presence of an immaterial thing 
before the immaterial matter, then God in his essence has knowledge of the perfections 
of creatures and of all the systems governing them, and this knowledge is a indivisible 
undifferentiated knowledge representing detailed unveiling. (Mulla Sadra, 1979).  
In other words, it can be suggested that God Almighty has the knowledge of his own 
essence and his essence contains all the perfections of beings. Therefore, the knowledge 
of the divine essence is the same as the knowledge of all beings; and since God's entity 
precedes all beings and the knowledge of the essence is the same as the essence; therefore, 
knowledge of the essence precedes all beings. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Both Avicenna and Mulla Sadra prove the God’s knowledge of essence through the union 
between the intellect and the intelligible, but Avicenna demonstrates God's knowledge of 
the creatures especially material and variable beings through imprinted forms necessary 
essentially for the essence of God and Mulla Sadra in contrast, proves it through the rule 
of “Basit ol-Haqiqa kol ol-Ashia va Laisa Besha'yen Menha” and the God’s intuitive 
knowledge . 
Mulla Sadra believes that Avicenna’s view is incomplete and suffer from some 
shortcomings such as the belief in acquired nature of God's knowledge of the beings and 
the emptiness of the divine essence of cognitive perfection and detailed knowledge. 
Therefore, he tries to put forward a theory that is free from the weaknesses and 
shortcomings contained within Avicenna's view . 
According to Mulla Sadra, knowledge is of the same nature of existence, and like 
existence, which being characterized by simplicity has degrees and orders, and he 
considers the highest degree of knowledge to be God's knowledge, which encompasses 
the perfections of all beings in the most comprehensive manner.  
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